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Editors’ Note
This essay reviews the Congressional debate surrounding the 
addition of the term “sex” to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
We included this essay because it serves as a reminder that the narra-
tives we construct regarding legal and legislative history are often at 
risk of oversimplification.  As the Justices of the Supreme Court delib-
erate and consider recent oral arguments regarding whether the term 
“sex” extends legal protections to persons on the basis of sexual ori-
entation or gender identity, the Congressional Record from February 
8, 1964 suggests one lesson: There are limits to relying on historical 
dialogues that exclude or mock marginalized voices.  That is, if many 
of the proclaimed supporters of an amendment advancing women’s 
equality supported it solely to undermine the passage of civil rights 
legislation, how instructive can it be to speculate about what they 
intended by the term “sex”?  While this essay does not answer this 
question, it suggests that the sincere supporters of the amendment—
and even those opposed to it on the grounds it would impede passage 
of the legislation—were fundamentally concerned with advancing 
equality for any and all groups who faced discrimination.
© 2020 Elizabeth Roth.  All rights reserved.
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Essay
On October 8, 2019, the United States Supreme Court heard 
oral arguments in two employment discrimination cases.1  The 
first oral argument consolidated two cases into Bostock v. Clayton 
County Board Of Commissioners, and queried whether Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s language “because of . . . sex” bars dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of an individual’s sexual 
orientation.2  The second case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes 
Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, asked the 
Court to answer whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against 
transgender people because they are transgender, or because it is 
impermissible sex stereotyping.3
In considering these two related questions, the Court may 
look to the Civil Rights Act’s legislative history in interpreting the 
phrase “because of . . . sex.”  As Justice Elena Kagan said during oral 
arguments in Bostock, “[f]or many years, the lodestar of this Court’s 
statutory interpretation has been the text of a statute, not the legis-
lative history, and certainly not the subsequent legislative history.”4 
However, the practice of interpreting legislative history may not be 
1. Adam Liptak & Jeremy Peters, Supreme Court Considers Whether 
Civil Rights Act Protects L.G.B.T. Workers, The New York Times, November 
7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/supreme-court-gay- 
transgender.html.
2. In Bostock v. Clayton County Board Of Commissioners, a panel of 
judges on the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Gerald Lynn Bostock’s 
Title VII sex discrimination claim, writing that Title VII did not protect employ-
ees from being discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation. 
723 Fed. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018); Bostock v. Clayton Cty Bd. Of Comm’rs, 
894 F. 3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (denying a rehearing en banc).  In the other 
consolidated case, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., the Second Circuit, sitting en 
banc, held that plaintiff Donald Zarda was entitled to bring his Title VII claim 
for employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. 883 F. 3d 100 (2d 
Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).  The Second Circuit observed that the language of 
Title VII, a broad, remedial statute, had evolved to encompass claims beyond 
race discrimination.  Citing Justice Scalia’s opinion for a unanimous 1998 de-
cision, the Second Circuit observed it is “the Supreme Court’s view that Title 
VII covers not just ‘the principal evil[s] Congress was concerned with when it 
enacted’ the statute in 1964, but also ‘reasonably comparable evils’ that meet 
the statutory requirements.” Id. at 112 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Fu-
neral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part sub nom. 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 139 S. Ct. 1599, 203 L. Ed. 
2d 754 (2019).
4. Oral Argument Bostock v. Clayton County, (No. 17–1618), and Al-
titude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, (No. 17–1623) available at https://www.supreme-
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2019/17-1618_7k47.pdf.
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so far in the rearview mirror.5  Furthermore, Justice Alito alluded to 
legislative history during oral arguments, claiming that critics of a 
decision interpreting “sex” more expansively will say that “whether 
Title VII should prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation is a big policy issue, and it is a different policy issue from 
the one that Congress thought it was addressing in 1964.”
But regardless of what factors the Justices consider, the leg-
islative history and Congressional record on this point are clouded 
by insincerity and murky motives.6  This is in part because Repre-
sentative Howard Smith (D-VA), chairman of the powerful Rules 
Committee and staunch opponent of civil rights, may have proposed 
amending Title VII to include “sex” with the purpose of sabotag-
ing the Civil Rights Act.7  Prior to February 8, 1964, the proposed 
law had enumerated only race, color, religion and national origin as 
unlawful categories.  By adding “sex,” he would delay the vote, thus 
spurring violent protests and white voter backlash.8  Another relat-
ed but distinct motive for the amendment may have been lobbying 
efforts targeted at Representative Smith by the National Women’s 
Party (NWP). 9  The NWP was a vestige of the women’s suffrage 
movement, whose practice of placing women’s rights ahead of 
racial equality persisted through the 1960s.  Many of its small but 
influential membership also harbored racist beliefs that drove them 
to oppose civil rights efforts that they viewed as undermining the 
interests of white women.
Indeed, probing the legislative history of “sex” under Title 
VII has proved challenging to the Court before.  As Justice William 
Rehnquist wrote in the Court’s landmark case addressing work-
place sexual harassment, meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was 
added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House 
of Representatives.  The principal argument in opposition to 
the amendment was that “sex discrimination” was sufficiently 
5. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia’s Fading Legacy, The New York 
Times, March 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/opinion/justice- 
antonin-scalia-legacy.html; see also Richard Epstein, Symposium: Title VII 
did not and does not extend to sexual orientation or gender identity—in 
1964 or  today, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 6, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.scotusblog.
com/2019/09/symposium-title-vii-did-not-and-does-not-extend-to-sexual- 
orientation-or-gender-identity-in-1964-or-today.
6. Louis Menand, How Women Got In on the Civil Rights Act, The 
New Yorker, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/21/
sex-amendment.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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different from other types of discrimination that it ought to 
receive separate legislative treatment.  This argument was 
defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left 
with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the 
Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on “sex.”10
This essay reviews the Congressional Record of Saturday, 
February 8, 1964 and focuses on the voices of the six Congresswom-
en—of the twelve elected women in the House of Representatives 
at that time, all of whom were white—who spoke up in response 
to the proposed amendment.11  Over twenty Representatives dis-
cussed the topic of sex discrimination, some of them vying for 
laughs at the expense of serious debate.  As Representative Edith 
Green (D-OR) observed, “I suppose that this may go down in his-
tory as ‘women’s afternoon,’ but the women of the House, I feel 
sure, recognize that you men will be the ones who finally make the 
decision.”12
In proposing the amendment adding “sex,” Representative 
Smith explained that he was “very serious about this amendment,” 
and continued, tongue firmly in cheek, to present background mate-
rial “to show you how some of the ladies feel about discrimination 
against them.”13  He said he proposed to insert the word “sex” after 
the “religion” “to prevent discrimination against another minori-
ty group, the women.”  He then read aloud from a letter he had 
received describing how women were struggling to find husbands 
because of the gender imbalance in the United States, partly due to 
too many wars.  As Representative Smith read the unnamed wom-
an’s plea on behalf of “poor unfortunate females” and “spinsters,” 
many of his fellow elected officials laughed uproariously.  He con-
cluded by saying, “I read that letter just to illustrate that women 
have some real grievances and some real rights to be protected.  I 
am serious about this thing.”14
Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) was next to speak. 
As Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Celler helped 
draft the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was committed to sending 
10. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
11. Representative Patsy Mink was the first woman of color to join Con-
gress, and was elected later that year.  The first African American Congress-
woman, Representative Shirley Chisholm, would not be elected until 1968. 
https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/Historical-Essays/
Changing-Guard/New-Patterns.
12. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577, 2581 (1964), available at https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1964-pt2/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1964-pt2-9-1.pdf.
13. Id. at 2577.
14. Id.
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the legislation to the Senate as originally drafted to avoid the risks 
associated with adding “sex” to the text.  He thus rose “in oppo-
sition to the amendment,” knowing of Representative Smith’s 
intention to undermine the bill.  Note the following exchange: Rep-
resentative Celler focused his remarks on a letter from the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Women’s Bureau, which observed that the 
President’s Commission on the Status of Women concluded that 
discrimination “based on sex  .  .  .  involves problems sufficiently 
different from discrimination based on other factors listed [in the 
legislation as originally drafted] to make separate treatment [of the 
issue] preferable.”15  Representative Celler also jabbed at Repre-
sentative Smith, stating, “I was a little surprised at your offering 
the amendment . . .  Because I think the amendment seems illog-
ical, ill-timed, ill-placed and improper.  I was of that opinion, the 
amendment coming from the astute and very wise gentleman from 
Virginia.”  Undeterred, Representative Smith replied, “Your sur-
prise at my offering the amendment does not nearly approach my 
surprise, amazement, and sorrow at your opposition to it.”16
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2578.  The unusual nature of the debate regarding the incorpo-
ration of “sex” into the Civil Rights Act has even found its way to Broadway 
in Robert Schenkkan’s political drama All the Way, winner of the 2014 Tony 
Award for Best Play.  The play depicts Lyndon Johnson’s first eleven months as 
President, and the intricate maneuvers leading to his signing of the legislation 
on July 2, 1964.  In the hands of Schenkkan, it is the age of Representative Smith 
(often referred to as Judge Smith, since he had been a judge in Virginia) and 
Representative Celler that leads to a moment of humor when the topic is sex. 
Schenkkan draws from the actual banter in the Congressional Record and gives 
one of the female legislators, Representative Katharine St. George (R-NY), a 
salty comic line that elicits laughs from her audience on the stage.  Here is 
Schenkkan’s dramatization of the sex amendment discussion:
Rep. Judge Smith: Very well.  I would like to introduce a new 
amendment forbiddin’ discrimination based on Sex.
Rep. Emanuel Celler (shouting): Gender has nothing to do with 
discrimination!  There are basic differences between Men and 
Women.
Rep. Judge Smith: Yes, I’m happily aware of the differences.  I sim-
ply feel that while we’re doin’ “Good” here, that White, Christian 
Anglo-Saxon women not be the only group left unprotected.
Rep. Emanuel Celler: In my memory, Sex has never been an issue 
in the civil rights bill!
Rep. Katharine St. George: It is possible, given the age of the 
Chairman, that sex itself may be no more than a distant memory.  
(Everyone laughs) I, for one, support this amendment forbidding 
discrimination based on Gender and I encourage my colleagues 
to do so!
All the Way (Grove Press, 2014, p. 47), Robert Schenkkan, All the Way, act 1. 
That stage direction devised by a gifted playwright—“Everyone laughs”—and 
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The two elders of the House, with these courtly and perfor-
mative remarks to each other, opened the floor for an unusual 
afternoon of rhetorical games.
Rising in support of the amendment, Representative Frances 
P. Bolton (R-OH) reminded her two senior colleagues that women 
were the majority of the population and had recently demonstrated 
their mettle with a strong showing at the ongoing Innsbruck Winter 
Olympics.  She also observed, “Even your bones harden long before 
our bones do—we [women] live longer, we have more endurance.”17 
She did request one modification to the amendment, perhaps to 
increase its likelihood of its passage: that it be offered as an amend-
ment to Title X, the miscellaneous title of the act.  Representative 
Smith replied that he did not like the idea of it going under “miscel-
laneous,” and that “women are entitled to more dignity than that.” 
Representative Bolton replied, wryly, “My colleague, may I suggest 
to you, that we are so used to being just ‘miscellaneous.’” 18
The lighthearted sparring turned serious when Representative 
Martha Griffiths (D-MI), rose in strong support of the amend-
ment, observing, “Mr. Chairman, I presume that if there had been 
any necessity to have pointed out that women were a second-class 
sex, the laughter would have proved it.”19  Weaving together legal 
hypotheticals, anecdotes, and historical references, Representative 
Griffiths addressed various arguments against the sex amendment, 
repeatedly requesting and receiving additional time to speak.20 
Notably, Griffiths had been a member of the N.W.P. 21  Thus, while 
making a compelling case for women’s equality, she also leaned 
heavily on N.W.P.’s racially charged and problematic talking points. 
These included framing the advancement of racial equity as under-
mining gender equity by claiming that white women would be “last 
at the hiring gate” and the only group “with no rights at all” if the 
Civil Rights Act passed without the amendment.22  Of course, this 
ignores the fact that Black women may face discrimination on the 
basis of both race and sex, and at the intersection of the two.23
its brief relief of tension is telling.  Schenkkan crisply captures the flippant tone 
of much of the “sex” debate.  In the broader and somber context of the play, 
which depicts the seeds of Lyndon Johnson’s complex political demise, this mo-
ment stands out and then slips by.
17. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2578.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2578–2580.
21. Menand, supra note 6.
22. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2578–79.
23. Crenshaw, Kimberle (1989) “Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
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Similarly, with regard to voting rights, she pointed out, “Mr. 
Chairman, your great-grandfathers were willing as prisoners of 
their own prejudice to permit ex-slaves to vote, but not their own 
white wives.”24  In response to concerns about potentially under-
mining protective legislation safeguarding the health of women, 
she observed, “Most of the so-called protective legislation has real-
ly been to protect men’s rights in better paying jobs.” 25  Finally, 
in recounting the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment giving 
women the right to vote, she argued that women’s rights were not 
advanced by women or white people alone: “White men voted for 
that right; but white people alone did not secure that right.  Colored 
men voted for that right, and colored women were among the suf-
fragettes.  Sojourner Truth, a Detroit woman, was the greatest of all 
of these.”26  She concludes, “[A] vote against the amendment today 
by a white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daugh-
ter, or his sister.” 27
The third woman to speak that day was Representative Kath-
arine St. George (R-NY).28  Representative St. George spoke up 
in favor of the amendment, and focused her remarks on respond-
ing directly to a main argument against the amendment: that the 
amendment was unnecessary because of robust, existing state laws.29 
She countered, “There are still many States where women cannot 
serve on juries.  There are still many States where women do not 
have equal educational opportunities.  In most States, and, in fact, I 
figure it would be safe to say, in all States—women do not get equal 
pay for equal work.  That is a very well known fact.”30  She also crit-
icized the protective legislation that “prevents women from going 
into the higher salary brackets” by limiting the late-night hours they 
can work at restaurants and cabarets.31  She then remarks, sarcasti-
cally, that people supporting such laws “have taken beautiful care 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” University of Chicago Legal Forum: 
Vol. 1989: Iss. 1, Article 8.  Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
uclf/vol1989/iss1/8.
24. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2580.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.  Representative St. George is also the politician playwright Robert 
Schenkkan depicted in All the Way as the feisty female presence in his humor-
ous condensed version of this debate.  Robert Schenkkan, All the Way.
29. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2580.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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of the women,” yet have never expressed concern or worry about 
women cleaning offices at two or three in the morning.32
She continued, chastising Representative Cellar for his com-
ment that the amendment was “illogical”: “What is illogical about 
it?  All you are doing is simply correcting something that goes back, 
frankly to the Dark Ages.  Because what you are doing is to go back 
to the days of the revolution when women were chattels.  Of course, 
women were not mentioned in the Constitution.  They belonged, 
first of all, to their fathers; then to their husbands or to their near-
est male relative.  They had no command over their own property. 
They were not supposed to be equal in any way, and certainly they 
were never expected to be or believed to be equal intellectually. 
Well, I will admit from what I have seen very frequently here, I 
think the majority sex in the House of Representatives may not 
consider us mentally quite equal, but I think on the whole con-
sidering what a small minority we are here that we have not done 
altogether too badly.” 33 Appealing to a potentially humorous trope, 
she said, “[Women] do not want special privileges.  We do not need 
special privilege.  We outlast you [men]—we outlive you—we nag 
you to death.  So why should we want special privileges?  I believe 
we can hold our own [and] are entitled to this little crumb of equal-
ity.  The addition of that little, terrifying word “s-e-x” will not hurt 
this legislation in any way.  In fact, it will improve it.  It will make it 
comprehensive.  It will make it logical.  It will make it right.”34
Representative Edith Green (D-OR), the next woman to 
speak, was well aware of the insidious motivations behind the 
amendment.35  Thus, while an outspoken advocate for women’s 
equality (she had even authored an earlier equal pay bill), she 
opposed the amendment and first highlighted the hypocrisy of 
many of the amendment’s supporters.36  Addressing Representative 
Smith, she said, “I wish to say first to the gentleman who offered 
this amendment and to others who by their applause I am sure are 
giving strong support to it that I, for one, welcome the conversion, 
because I remember when we were working on the equal pay bill, 
that, if I correctly understand the mood of the House, those gentle-
men of the House who are most strong in their support of women’s 
rights this afternoon, probably gave us the most opposition when 
we considered the bill which would grant equal pay for equal work 
just a very few months ago.  I say I welcome the conversion and 
32. Id. at 2581.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Menand, supra note 6.
36. 110 Cong. Rec. at 2581.
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hope it is of long duration.”37  She continued, voicing concern for 
the haphazard introduction of the sex amendment and stating, “I do 
not believe this is the time or place for this amendment.”38
After emphasizing the uniquely severe and pervasive nature 
of race discrimination, Representative Green said, “[L]et us not 
add any amendment that would place in jeopardy in any way our 
primary objective of ending that discrimination that is most serious, 
most urgent, most tragic, and most widespread against the Negroes 
[sic] of our country.” 39  She also noted she was not in “complete 
agreement with everything said by [her] women colleagues,” and 
that while she had been discriminated against, she believed Black 
women had “suffered 10 times that amount of discrimination” and 
faced “a double discrimination.” 40  She was therefore willing to wait 
a few years to end “the discrimination against me, and my women 
friends” if they could finally end race discrimination.41  Representa-
tive Green concluded by reading a from a letter from the American 
Association of University Women which expressed concern that 
the amendment could weaken or impede passage of the entire act.42
The fifth elected woman to speak that day was Representative 
Catherine May (R-WA) who rose in favor of the amendment and 
noted, “You have heard eloquent, articulate, logical and consistent 
arguments in support of this amendment from my distinguished fel-
low female colleagues from both sides of the aisle.”  While also an 
advocate for women’s equality closely aligned with Representative 
Green on most issues, she stated, “[M]ay I point out to [Represen-
tative Green] that I just cannot assume, as she has, that the addition 
of this important amendment, no matter who offers it, will jeopar-
dize this bill.”  As if anticipating arguments regarding potentially 
insidious motivations behind the sex amendment, she remarked, “I 
would say that I do not think we can ever really assume what is in 
the mind of any one of the 435 Members of the House when he 
offers an amendment . . . I would not assume that responsibility.”43 
Citing a letter from the NWP expressing “alarm over the complete 
absence in this bill of any reference to civil rights for women,” she 
urged support for the amendment.44
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2581–2.
41. Id. at 2582.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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The final woman to speak was Representative Edna Kelly 
(D-NY), who rose in favor of the amendment but nevertheless 
“compliment[ed]” Representative Green, presumably because 
Kelly was sympathetic to the reason for Green’s opposition.45  But 
for Representative Kelly, the issue was simple: “If this section VII, 
equal employment opportunity section cannot be perfected to 
include women, then, it has no place in the bill.  Why restore civil 
rights to all and fail to give equal opportunity to all.  My support 
and sponsorship of this amendment and of this bill is an endeavor 
to have all persons, men and women, possess the same rights and 
same opportunities.  In this amendment we seek equal opportunity 
in employment for women.  No more—no less.”46
Following Representative Kelly’s remarks, more Congress-
men rose in support of the amendment, but most offered seemingly 
sarcastic or insincere endorsements.  For example, Representative 
J. Russell Tuten (D-GA), struck by the “brilliant performance” of 
his female colleagues, said he would “accept [his] place, ladies, as 
a second-class citizen” and “member of a minority group,” since, as 
Representative Bolton had noted,47 women outnumbered men in 
the United States.48  He continued, “I have been vigorously opposed 
to this bill—not as a racist—but in the interest of the rights of all 
of the citizens of this country.  Since I am a man, which places me 
in the minority and makes me a second-class citizen—and the fact 
that I am white and from the South—I look forward to claiming 
my rights under the terms of this legislation.”  More Congressmen 
focused on the need to ensure white women were not at a disadvan-
tage relative to non-white persons.49
Representative Green made one final attempt to highlight 
the hypocrisy and insincerity of the recent women’s equality con-
verts, remarking that she was “touched by the strong support of 
this legislation by some of my colleagues”50 because previously 
these very gentlemen “were the strongest in their opposition to a 
45. Id. at 2582–3.
46. Id. at 2583.
47. Id. at 2578.
48. Id. at 2583.
49. Representative George W. Andrews (Democrat, Alabama) said, “[t]
he white woman will be at a great disadvantage in the business world unless 
this amendment is adopted.”  Representative Mendel Rivers (Democrat, South 
Carolina) said, “[i]t is incredible to me that the authors of this monstrosity—
whomever they are—would deprive the white woman of mostly Anglo-Saxon 
or Christian heritage equal opportunity before the employer.  I know this Con-
gress will not be a party to such an evil.” Id.
50. Id. at 2584.
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very simple bill to provide equal pay for equal work for women.”51 
But her argument fell flat, even with an attempted assist from civil 
rights advocate Representative James Roosevelt II, eldest son of 
President Franklin Roosevelt.  Despite the lengthy, substantive par-
ticipation of many elected women that afternoon, a man supporting 
the amendment, Representative Ezekiel Gathings (D-AR), had the 
final word before a vote was called.52
Toward the end of the debate, prominent advocates for civil 
rights including Representative James Roosevelt (D-CA) reiter-
ated Representative Celler’s opening argument.  When the votes 
were counted, the amendment adding “sex” as a protected class 
passed, with the tellers reporting 168 votes to 133 votes.53  And, no 
doubt much to the surprise of Representatives Celler and Green, so 
did the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  As legal advocate Gillian Thom-
as observed in her account of the lawsuits following the passage of 
Title VII, “the law best known as a monumental achievement for 
African Americans’ civil rights was a milestone in the struggle for 
sex equality too.  Title VII started a revolution for women.” 54  This 
legacy includes increased representation by women, including the 
105 women who are currently serving in the House of Representa-
tives in the 116th Congress.55
51. Id.
52. Id.  Representative Gathings argued, “[t]here can be no plausible rea-
son that a white woman should be deprived of an equal opportunity to get a job 
simply because of her sex and a colored woman obtain that position because 
of her preferential rights as contained in this bill.  Title VII seeks to make it an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of race, col-
or, religion or national origin.  The language covers all employees, or would-be 
employees, except white women.”  Id.
53. Id.
54. Gillian Thomas, Because of Sex: One Law, Ten Cases, and Fifty Years 
That Changed American Women’s Lives at Work, 3 (St. Martin’s Press 1st ed. 
2016).
55. Women Serving in the 116th Congress 2019–21, available at https://
cawp.rutgers.edu/list-women-currently-serving-congress.

